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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
When his old law firm broke its lease, attorney Paul 
Titus was on the hook for millions of dollars in unpaid 
commercial rent.  The landlord tried to recover the rent by 
targeting the wages Mr. Titus was earning at his new firm.  But 
Mr. Titus’s wages never passed through his hands alone; 
instead, they were deposited by his new firm directly into a 
bank account owned by both Mr. Titus and his wife as tenants 
by the entireties. 
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Eventually, Mr. Titus was forced into bankruptcy and 
the landlord’s claim became a claim of the bankruptcy trustee.  
Now, after two trials in the Bankruptcy Court and two appeals 
to the District Court, we reach three conclusions.  First, Mr. 
and Mrs. Titus are liable for a fraudulent transfer.  When the 
wages of an insolvent spouse are deposited into a couple’s 
entireties account, both spouses are fraudulent transferees.  
Second, as for the precise measure of the Tituses’ liability, the 
bankruptcy trustee waived any challenge to the method used 
by previous courts to calculate fraudulent-transfer liability.  
Going forward, however, we clarify how future courts should 
measure liability when faced with an entireties account like the 
Tituses’ — an account into which deposits consist of both 
(fraudulent) wages and (non-fraudulent) other sources, and 
from which cash is spent on both (permissible) household 
necessities and (impermissible) other expenditures.1  Until 
now, a trustee somehow had to show that wage deposits were 
impermissibly spent on non-necessary expenditures, even 
though wage and nonwage deposits had become commingled 
in the account.  Rather than expect a trustee to trace the 
untraceable, future courts should generally presume that wage 
deposits were spent on non-necessary expenditures in 
proportion to the overall share of wages in the account as a 
whole.  Third, in evaluating the Bankruptcy Court’s 
                                              
1  Judge Shwartz joins the opinion in all respects except 
its discussion of the pro rata approach because, among other 
things, the panel has unanimously concluded that the trustee 
waived his challenge to the method of calculating the Tituses’ 
liability, and thus it is unnecessary to discuss the pro rata 
approach.  Judge Shwartz is also of the view that the method 
for calculating the amount of fraudulent-transfer liability 
should be left to the discretion of the trial judge based upon the 
evidence provided.  Cf. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Case: 17-3823     Document: 003113165054     Page: 3      Date Filed: 02/20/2019
4 
 
application of the method in play at the time of its decision, we 
perceive no clear error.  Thus we affirm. 
I. Background 
A. Facts 
In 1999, the Pittsburgh law firm of Titus & McConomy 
dissolved.  One of the firm’s named partners, Paul Titus, joined 
another firm, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP.  The 
Schnader firm began depositing Mr. Titus’s wages into a bank 
account he owned jointly with his wife. 
Evidently the dissolved Titus firm had walked away 
from its commercial lease.  To recover rent that had gone 
unpaid since the dissolution, the landlord brought a breach-of-
contract suit against the former partners of the Titus firm and 
ultimately secured a multimillion dollar judgment against the 
partners, including Mr. Titus. 
 Armed with the breach-of-contract judgment, the 
landlord set its sights on the wages that Mr. Titus’s new 
employer, the Schnader firm, was depositing into the Tituses’ 
bank account.  It brought a fraudulent-transfer action in 
Pennsylvania state court against Mr. and Mrs. Titus.  This 
triggered an involuntary bankruptcy against Mr. Titus.  Thus 
the landlord’s fraudulent-transfer claim became a claim of the 
bankruptcy trustee in the Bankruptcy Court.2 
                                              
2  Several former partners of the Titus firm have faced the 
same fate since the firm’s dissolution.  See In re Wettach, 811 
F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2016); Cardiello v. Arbogast, 533 F. App’x 
150 (3d Cir. 2013); Cohen v. Sikirica, 487 B.R. 615 (W.D. Pa. 
2013); In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013). 
Case: 17-3823     Document: 003113165054     Page: 4      Date Filed: 02/20/2019
5 
 
B. Procedural History in Bankruptcy 
After a first trial, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that 
the direct deposit of wages into the Tituses’ bank account was 
a fraudulent transfer that the trustee could recover from either 
Mr. or Mrs. Titus, who jointly owned the account as tenants by 
the entireties.  As for the measure of liability, Mr. and Mrs. 
Titus were liable for the amount of Mr. Titus’s wages that were 
“not spent on necessities.”  In re Titus (Titus I), 467 B.R. 592, 
620 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012). 
On appeal, the District Court affirmed that the wage 
deposits were a fraudulent transfer.  It remanded for a new trial, 
however, to give the Tituses a second chance to identify both 
the source of certain “unexplained deposits” into the bank 
account and the destination of certain “unknown expenditures” 
from the account.  Titus v. Shearer (Titus II), 498 B.R. 508, 
520, 525 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
After a second trial, the Bankruptcy Court made the 
following findings as to deposits into, and expenditures from, 
the bank account: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Total Wages 
$1,125,255.58 
 
Explained 
Nonwages 
$634,998.83 
Entireties Account  
($91,272 preexisting) 
Necessities  
$1,134,000.67 
Non-Necessities 
$1,000,133.51 
DEPOSITS EXPENDITURES 
Unexplained 
Nonwages  
$268,167.09 
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See In re Titus (Titus III), 566 B.R. 755, 797 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2017).  A note on terminology:  The Bankruptcy Court divided 
the spending from the account into “necessity expenditures” 
and “non-necessity expenditures,” which it sometimes called 
“Non-Objectionable Expenditures” and “Objectionable 
Expenditures,” respectively.  See, e.g., id.; see also id. at 765, 
768, 777–78.  For simplicity, we use the necessity/non-
necessity nomenclature.  To give some content to these terms, 
“necessities” included items such as a lawnmower and 
batteries, id. at 792–93, while the Tituses’ “non-necessities” 
included, among other things, their grandson’s application fee 
to Notre Dame, id. at 797. 
 Using the figures set out above, the Bankruptcy Court 
went about calculating the Tituses’ liability.  But the Court 
immediately hit a roadblock:  Because money is fungible and 
wage and nonwage deposits commingled in the account, it was 
impossible to determine whether a dollar of wages was 
eventually spent on a permissible “necessity” or an 
impermissible “non-necessity.”  As a result, the Court had to 
calculate liability indirectly. 
It did so using what it could measure: nonwage deposits 
and non-necessity spending, which are represented below the 
dotted line in the chart.  The Court’s underlying assumption 
was that all explained, nonwage sources of cash in the account 
(both explained nonwage deposits and cash already in the 
account) were spent on non-necessities before any wage 
deposits were impermissibly spent on whatever non-
necessities remained.  Thus the Tituses’ total liability was:  
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(Non-Necessities) – (Explained Nonwages) – (Initial Balance) 
= $1,000,133.51 – $634,998.83 – $91,272.00 
= $273,862.68. 
Id. at 799.  Over the Tituses’ objection, the Court did not offset 
their non-necessity spending even further by the amount of 
unexplained nonwage deposits.  Had it done so, an additional 
$268,167.09 would have been shaved off the remaining non-
necessity spending, leaving a judgment against the Tituses of 
only $5,695.59. 
The District Court affirmed.  Neither side is fully 
satisfied with various rulings of the Bankruptcy and District 
Courts, and both have appealed. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the final 
order of the Bankruptcy Court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We 
have jurisdiction to review the final order of the District Court 
per 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the 
District Court acted as an appellate court, we review its 
determinations de novo.  In re Bocchino, 794 F.3d 376, 379 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  We review the legal conclusions of the Bankruptcy 
Court de novo and its factual determinations for clear error.  Id. 
at 380. 
III. Discussion 
After two trials in the Bankruptcy Court, two appeals to 
the District Court, and four rounds of briefing in our Court, 
there are three issues for our review: 
(1) Are the Tituses liable for a fraudulent transfer?   
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(2) Did the trustee waive any challenge to the method 
used to calculate the Tituses’ liability?   
(3) Did the Bankruptcy Court clearly err in applying the 
method it used? 
We include an additional area of discussion on the 
second issue.  Even if the trustee waived its challenge to the 
calculation method, should future courts measure liability for 
commingled accounts differently? 
A. Threshold Fraudulent-Transfer Liability 
The bankruptcy trustee “may avoid any transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property” if the transfer “is voidable 
under applicable law by a creditor.”  11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).  
The applicable law here, the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (PUFTA), permits a creditor to avoid a fraudulent 
transfer “to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.”  
12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5107(a)(1).3 
 We reach three conclusions on the threshold question of 
the Tituses’ fraudulent-transfer liability.  First, the wage 
deposits into the Tituses’ entireties account were a “transfer” 
under the PUFTA.  Second, Mrs. Titus is personally subject to 
PUFTA liability as an entireties tenant.  Third, Mr. Titus is 
subject to transferee liability even though he is the debtor-
transferor as well.  As a result, the wage deposits constituted a 
fraudulent transfer that the bankruptcy trustee could avoid. 
                                              
3  As of February 22, 2018, the PUFTA was renamed the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.  See 12 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5101(a). 
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 1.   The wage deposits constituted a “transfer.”  
“[T]he direct deposit of wages into an entireties account 
is a ‘transfer’ of an ‘asset’ under the PUFTA.”  Wettach, 811 
F.3d at 115.  This statement settles the question whether the 
wage deposits from the Schnader firm into the Tituses’ 
entireties account were a transfer. 
The reasoning behind this conclusion is as follows.  On 
a macro level, Mr. Titus’s wages (i) began as his “asset” for 
purposes of the PUFTA and (ii) were not his “asset” once they 
were in the entireties account.  Id at 114–15.  That change in 
status is deemed a “transfer.”  Id. at 115. 
As to the first point, Mr. Titus “exercised control over 
where his employer deposited his wages.”  See id. at 114.  This 
control overrode Pennsylvania’s baseline rule that “wages” are 
exempt from creditors “while in the hands of the employer.”  
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8127(a).  In other words, when the 
Schnader firm “initiated the direct deposit,” the wages left 
Schnader’s “hands” and became, temporarily, an asset of Mr. 
Titus.  See Wettach, 811 F.3d at 114–15.   
As to the second point, the wages ceased being an 
“asset” of Mr. Titus once they were in the entireties account.  
The definition of “asset” under the PUFTA excludes property 
held in a tenancy by the entireties “to the extent it is not subject 
to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one 
tenant.”  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101(b).  That predicate is 
satisfied here:  The landlord held a claim against only one 
entireties tenant (Mr. Titus), and “entireties property is 
unavailable to satisfy the claims of the creditor of only one of 
the tenants.”  Garden State Standardbred Sales Co. v. Seese, 
611 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).  As a result, once 
the wage deposits reached the entireties bank account, they 
were no longer an “asset” of Mr. Titus under the PUFTA. 
Case: 17-3823     Document: 003113165054     Page: 9      Date Filed: 02/20/2019
10 
 
Putting these points together, Mr. Titus started with an 
“asset” and later relinquished it to the entireties account.  This 
maneuver meets the PUFTA’s definition of “transfer” as an 
“indirect . . . disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest 
in an asset.”  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101(b).  To sum up, Mr. 
Titus, “by depositing [his] own funds into an entireties bank 
account, is converting [the] funds into entireties property and, 
thereby, transferring [that] property for purposes of the 
[PUFTA].”  See In re Meinen, 232 B.R. 827, 841 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1999) (setting out the reasoning above). 
2.   Mrs. Titus is a transferee subject to PUFTA liability.  
Even assuming that the wage deposits were a “transfer” 
under the PUFTA, Mrs. Titus has a further objection of her 
own — that her status as a co-tenant by the entireties cannot 
open her up to personal liability for wages deposited by her 
insolvent husband into their joint account. 
Case law prevents this position’s success.  “[W]hen a 
spouse conveys individual property to a tenancy by the 
entireties in fraud of creditors, the creditor may nevertheless 
execute against the property so conveyed.”  Garden State, 611 
A.2d at 1243; see also Stinner v. Stinner, 446 A.2d 651, 652 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (same).  Numerous courts have applied 
this rule to hold an insolvent debtor’s spouse personally liable 
for a fraudulent transfer.  See, e.g., Wettach, 811 F.3d at 114–
15; Meinen, 232 B.R. at 840–41; Garden State, 611 A.2d at 
1243; Stinner, 446 A.2d at 652. 
In doing so, courts have acknowledged the point that 
Mrs. Titus urges here — that this liability rule leads to a harsh 
result.  See, e.g., Stinner, 446 A.2d at 654–55 (McEwen, J., 
concurring) (applying the rule “even though I find it most 
difficult to accept the determination that the regular routine 
deposit of salary and bonuses by a husband, into a household 
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checking account owned by himself and his wife as tenants by 
the entireties, is a conveyance of individual property in fraud 
of creditors”).  One court even “invite[d] the General 
Assembly” to scrap the usual creditor-friendly presumption of 
a fraudulent transfer “when the conveyance results in the 
creation of entireties property.”  Garden State, 611 A.2d at 
1243–44.  All courts nonetheless continue to apply the rule. 
3. Mr. Titus is subject to PUFTA transferee liability 
even though he is the debtor-transferor as well.  
Mr. Titus is both transferor and transferee.  As an 
individual debtor-transferor, he is subject to liability under the 
landlord’s claim for breach of the lease agreement.  As a 
transferee, he has fraudulent-transfer liability as a tenant of the 
entireties account.  In sum, his different capacities make him 
liable in different ways.  His argument that he cannot be both 
transferor and transferee therefore fails. 
Nor is there a risk of double recovery — that is, one 
recovery from Mr. Titus as an individual debtor and another 
from him as an entireties tenant.  Once the trustee secures a 
recovery from one source, he will not have recourse against the 
other source.  Cf. In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 354 F.3d 1246, 
1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the trustee may only “restore 
the estate to the financial condition it would have enjoyed if 
the transfer had not occurred”) (quotations omitted).  The 
fraudulent-transfer suit was only instituted as part of the overall 
collection effort to satisfy the judgment entered on the breach 
of the lease agreement. 
B. Method for Calculating PUFTA Liability 
Having concluded that Mr. and Mrs. Titus can be 
individually liable for a fraudulent transfer of Mr. Titus’s 
wages, we reach the question of how to measure that liability.  
Case: 17-3823     Document: 003113165054     Page: 11      Date Filed: 02/20/2019
12 
 
We begin with the baseline rule that a transfer is not 
“fraudulent” under the PUFTA if the wages deposited into the 
entireties account are “used to pay for reasonable and 
necessary household expenses.”  Wettach, 811 F.3d at 105 
(quotations omitted) (discussing 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5104(a)(2)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (providing that the 
trustee in a § 544 action “may recover” from a transferee either 
“the property transferred” or “the value of such property,” but 
not explaining how to identify the property or calculate its 
value in the first place).  This rule accounts for the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision, explained above, to segregate expenditures 
from the account into “necessities” and “non-necessities.”  But, 
having determined the amounts of wage deposits, nonwage 
deposits, necessity spending, and non-necessity spending, the 
question remains how to combine these inputs to reach a figure 
for the Tituses’ liability.  This question, in turn, depends on the 
allocation of burdens in a fraudulent-transfer action in 
Pennsylvania. 
Between the two trials in this case, we clarified the 
burdens in a PUFTA action.  First, our Court presumes that 
“funds deposited into an entireties account were not in 
exchange for reasonably equivalent value.”  Wettach, 811 F.3d 
at 111.  In our case, this means we presume that the wages in 
question were not spent on necessities.  See id.  Second, the 
Tituses may rebut that presumption by producing “some 
evidence as to uses of funds in the entireties account.”  Id. at 
109 (quotations omitted).  Imposing this burden of production 
on the Tituses “serves an information-forcing purpose” by 
requiring them “to come forward with information” about 
“how they used funds transferred into [the] entireties account.”  
Id.  Third, once the Tituses have met their burden of 
production, the trustee bears the burden of persuasion “as to all 
elements of a constructive fraudulent-transfer claim under the 
PUFTA.”  Id. at 107.  Among other things, the trustee must 
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that wage deposits 
were not spent on necessities. 
But the trustee is faced with what appears to be an 
impossible task in a commingled account, circumstances that 
did not exist in other cases before us.  Because money is 
fungible, and funds from multiple sources commingle in the 
entireties account, “it may be impossible to determine what 
deposit was used for a particular expenditure.”  In re Wettach, 
489 B.R. 496, 507 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013); see also Oberdick, 
490 B.R. at 710 n.15 (describing the “impossible burden” on 
the trustee to trace deposits into the account to spending from 
the account). 
No wonder, then, that the trustee here could not carry 
his burden of persuasion.  For example, in the first trial in this 
case, the Bankruptcy Court explained that it was “at least as 
likely as not” that a given dollar of deposits went toward 
necessity spending as toward non-necessity spending.  Titus I, 
467 B.R. at 624.  As a result, the trustee “ha[d] not 
preponderantly proven” that wages were improperly spent on 
non-necessities.  Id.  The uncertainty of the dollar’s final 
destination, moreover, is compounded by a “fairness issue” — 
namely, Mr. and Mrs. Titus “created the uncertainty by 
commingling the funds,” but the trustee “is expected to 
somehow unravel it.”  See Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 710 n.15. 
Faced with this commingling problem, every court to 
encounter the issue has adopted a baseline assumption:  All 
explained nonwage deposits were spent on non-necessities 
before any wage deposits were spent on non-necessities.  E.g., 
Titus v. Shearer (Titus IV), No. AP 10-2338, 2017 WL 
5467712, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2017) (“The bankruptcy 
court found . . . that all non-necessities were purchased with 
explained nonwages.”).  Another way of stating the same 
assumption is that all wage deposits were spent on necessities 
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before being spent on anything else.  Either phrasing expresses 
the same idea:  Deposited funds travel horizontally, rather than 
diagonally, across the charts reproduced in this opinion.  See 
supra p. 5; infra p. 15.  The assumption has supported a method 
for calculating PUFTA liability, which parties and courts have 
dubbed the “Non-Necessities Approach” or the “Other Deposit 
Methodology.”  It provides the following formula for 
calculating fraudulent-transfer liability: 
Liability = (Non-Necessity Spending) – (Nonwage Deposits). 
In this case, the trustee waived any challenge to the 
selection of this method and formula.  An issue is waived on 
remand if it was “not raised in a party’s prior appeal.”  
Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 203 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  Also, “when a party fails to raise an issue in the 
bankruptcy court, the issue is waived.”  In re Kaiser Grp. Int’l 
Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2005).  The trustee here did 
not object to the Non-Necessities Approach during the first 
trial in the Bankruptcy Court or in the first appeal to the District 
Court.  Instead, he waited to challenge it for the first time on 
remand to the Bankruptcy Court for a second trial.  See Titus 
III, 566 B.R. at 769.  Thus the Bankruptcy Court and District 
Court agreed that the choice of method had been waived.  See, 
e.g., id. at 773.  We affirm that conclusion.  Hence we turn to 
its application in the next section.  
Before doing so, however, we set out a different way to 
calculate liability for future courts facing commingled funds: 
the pro rata approach.  Under this approach, we presume, 
absent other evidence, that spending out of the entireties 
account was made up of a mixture of wage and nonwage 
deposits in proportion to the overall ratio of wage to nonwage 
deposits in the account.  As we explain below, this approach 
addresses practically the commingling of fungible funds in the 
account and is not foreclosed by precedent in our Circuit. 
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1. The pro rata approach accounts practically for the 
commingling of fungible funds.  
As noted, the first Bankruptcy Court in this case stated 
that it was “at least as likely as not” that a dollar of nonwage 
deposits funded non-necessity spending, and that the trustee 
had therefore failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that wage deposits impermissibly funded non-
necessities.  See Titus I, 467 B.R. at 624.  This is incorrect.  
Absent unusual circumstances, a dollar deposited into the 
account is equally likely to be spent on necessities and on non-
necessities only if the same amount is spent on both necessities 
and non-necessities.  In all other situations, the deposited dollar 
is more likely to be spent on whichever category of spending 
(necessities or non-necessities) is larger.  By the same token, a 
dollar spent from the account is more likely to come from 
whichever category of deposits (wage or nonwage) is larger. 
The pro rata approach accounts for the fungibility of 
wage and nonwage funds that are commingled in the entireties 
account.  In our case, the liability would be calculated based on 
the inflows and outflows found by the second Bankruptcy 
Court decision (for simplicity, and to be consistent with our 
conclusion in the next section, we have eliminated 
“unexplained” nonwage deposits): 
 
 
 
  
 
Total Wages 
$1,125,255.58 
 
Nonwage 
Deposits 
$634,998.83 
Entireties Account  
($91,272 preexisting) 
Necessities  
$1,134,000.67 
Non-Necessities 
$1,000,133.51 
DEPOSITS EXPENDITURES 
Case: 17-3823     Document: 003113165054     Page: 15      Date Filed: 02/20/2019
16 
 
Titus III, 566 B.R. at 797.  The total amount of money flowing 
into the account is the sum of wage deposits, nonwage 
deposits, and preexisting cash in the account: 
Total Inflows = (Wages) + (Nonwages) + (Preexisting Cash) 
= ($1,125,255.58) + ($634,998.83) + ($91,272) 
= $1,851,526.41. 
Thus the calculation of wage deposits as a percentage of total 
inflows is: 
(Wage Deposits) / (Total Inflows)  
= ($1,125,255.58) / ($1,851,526.41) 
= 60.8%. 
Hence we can presume that, of the $1,000,133.51 spent on non-
necessities, 60.8% impermissibly came from wage deposits.  
The Tituses’ liability would be that wage-derived portion: 
(0.608) * ($1,000,133.51) = $607,825.96. 
Eyeballing these figures, we note that this measure of 
liability makes intuitive sense:  Wages account for just under 
two-thirds of all deposits into the account, so it stands to reason 
that just under two-thirds of all non-necessity spending came 
from wage deposits.  Appropriately, then, the Tituses’ liability 
under the pro rata approach would be just under two-thirds of 
all non-necessity spending. 
We add one further note on the mechanics of the pro 
rata approach.  We alluded earlier to “unusual circumstances” 
that could overcome the default presumption that spending out 
of the entireties account is made up of a mixture of wage and 
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nonwage dollars in proportion to the overall ratio of wage to 
nonwage deposits into the account.  See supra p. 15.  Recall 
that the pro rata approach rests on our observation that a 
trustee should not be asked to trace the untraceable.  It follows 
that the presumption would yield where a factfinder could trace 
the (ordinarily) untraceable — in other words, where the 
factfinder could track a dollar from a given category of deposits 
into a given category of spending.   
Say, for instance, that a trial court could trace X dollars 
of nonwage deposits into an account to X dollars of non-
necessity spending from the account.  (An example might be 
monies placed into the account from a bequest requiring its 
spending on what is not necessary.)  Before performing the pro 
rata calculation for the rest of the cash inflows and outflows, 
the trial court would reduce both its nonwage deposit figure 
and its non-necessity spending figure by X.  The result of this 
reduction in nonwage deposits (while wage deposits remain 
constant) would be a greater percentage share of all deposits 
into the account coming from wages.  This greater percentage 
share would then be applied to the reduced amount of total non-
necessity spending.   
In sum, the trial court should trace whatever is traceable 
before using the pro rata approach to proportionally derive the 
untraceable flows.  We leave to the trial court’s discretion the 
threshold decision whether it is able to trace the ordinarily 
untraceable. 
2. The pro rata approach is not foreclosed by 
precedent in our Circuit.  
The only possible precedent of this Court, Wettach, 811 
F.3d 99, does not foreclose the pro rata approach.  In the 
course of setting out the rebuttable presumption and the 
burdens of production and persuasion, the Wettach Court noted 
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that the Bankruptcy Court had applied the Non-Necessities 
Approach, which we abandon today for certain situations in 
which an account is commingled.  We explained that Mr. and 
Mrs. Wettach, who bore the burden of production,  
produced no evidence to demonstrate how they 
spent the wages deposited into the entireties 
account.  The bankruptcy court even offered 
them a “dollar-for-dollar reduction against any 
liability” for other deposits into the account. . . .  
Having failed to carry their burden of production 
and absent clear error by the bankruptcy court, 
the Wettachs have no claim for relief on appeal. 
Wettach, 811 F.3d at 111 (quoting Wettach, 489 B.R. at 507) 
(emphasis added).  The “dollar-for-dollar reduction” for 
nonwage deposits refers to the formula dictated by the Non-
Necessities Approach (Liability = Non-Necessity Spending – 
Nonwage Deposits). 
For three reasons, however, this statement in Wettach 
does not mandate the Non-Necessities Approach for accounts 
that commingle wage and nonwage deposits.   
First, the passage is not a ringing endorsement of the 
approach.  We merely noted that the Bankruptcy Court “even 
offered” the Wettachs another potential offset.  The statement 
is hardly a holding. 
Second, even if the statement were taken as a holding, 
Wettach is distinguishable.  It confronted a mixture of deposits 
much simpler than those facing us here:  The Wettachs had 
produced “no evidence of any ‘other deposits.’”  See Titus III, 
566 B.R. at 772 (discussing Wettach).  In other words, “the 
only deposits that proved to be at issue in Wettach were the 
wage deposits of the debtor.”  Id.  As a result, the Wettach 
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Court had no need to “directly address” the choice of method 
for measuring liability.  Id.  When the only source of funding 
into an account is wage deposits, there is no mystery about the 
source of a dollar spent on non-necessities, and thus no reason 
to consider a way of measuring liability like the pro rata 
approach.  Hence Wettach does not bind us now. 
Third, even the Wettach Bankruptcy Court expressed 
“some reservations” about the dollar-for-dollar offset dictated 
by the Non-Necessities Approach.   Wettach, 489 B.R. at 507 
(Agresti, J.).  Bankruptcy Judge Agresti applied the approach 
only because a prior District Court decision had already 
approved it.  See id. at 507–08 (citing Cohen, 487 B.R. 615).  
In yet another case arising out of the dissolution of the Titus 
firm, moreover, Judge Agresti had sounded the alarm about the 
dollar-for-dollar offset.  See Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 710 n.15 
(“The Court does have some concerns about the [Non-
Necessities Approach] as to this point.”).  Were he “writing on 
a blank slate,” he explained he would “give serious 
consideration” to employing “a presumption” in which “a pro 
rata share of the non-necessary expenditures could be deemed 
to have come from funds originating from the other deposits.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  Now faced with such a blank slate, we 
follow Judge Agresti’s prescient thinking. 
* * * 
 In sum, the trustee missed his chance to challenge the 
use of the Non-Necessities Approach in the first appeal to the 
District Court.  Hence his objection to the method for 
measuring liability has been waived.  Going forward, however, 
courts faced with the situation here — in which wages and 
nonwages are commingled in a single account and are 
subsequently spent on both necessities and non-necessities — 
should apply a pro rata approach.  They should presume, 
absent other evidence, that any spending out of the account was 
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made up of a mixture of wage and nonwage dollars in 
proportion to the overall ratio of wage to nonwage deposits in 
the account. 
C. Application of Non-Necessities Approach 
Because the trustee waived his argument that another 
method should apply in calculating liability, we turn to the 
parties’ dispute over the application of the Non-Necessities 
Approach.  To repeat, the approach proceeds from the 
assumption that all nonwage deposits into the account were 
spent on non-necessities before any wage deposits were 
impermissibly spent on non-necessities.  This, in turn, informs 
its formula for fraudulent-transfer liability: 
 
Liability = (Non-Necessity Spending) – (Nonwage Deposits). 
The final skirmish in the case centers on the last term in 
the formula: nonwage deposits.  In the Bankruptcy Court, the 
parties stipulated that nonwage deposits could be divided into 
$634,998.83 of explained nonwage deposits and $268,167.09 
of unexplained nonwage deposits.  See Titus III, 566 B.R. at 
798 (“The Parties agree that [the $268,167.09] were not wage 
deposits, but they also agree that other than being non-wage 
the source or sources of such deposits are unexplained.”).  In 
applying the Non-Necessities Approach, the Bankruptcy Court 
counted only explained nonwage deposits toward the 
“nonwage deposits” term in the formula.  Had the Court also 
counted the $268,167.09 of stipulated unexplained nonwage 
deposits, the Tituses’ ultimate liability would have been 
reduced from $273,862.68 to $5,695.59.  Thus the question 
presented in this section is whether the parties’ joint stipulation 
that the unexplained deposits were not wages was sufficient to 
meet the Tituses’ burden of production as to nonwage deposits.   
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To begin, we review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision 
on this point for clear error.  See Wettach, 811 F.3d at 111.  The 
Court did not commit clear error in the face of the “bright line 
rule” established by the District Court that “unexplained 
deposits may not be used to set off liability.”  Titus III, 566 
B.R. at 768 (“[T]he District Court . . . does not provide for any 
discretion in the matter — it provides there shall be no 
reduction for unexplained deposits.”).  In remanding the case 
for a second trial, the District Court made clear that the Tituses 
would need to “produce evidence about the source of the 
unknown funds” in order to offset their liability.  Titus II, 498 
B.R. at 521. 
Aside from expecting the Tituses to follow this 
straightforward directive, there are at least three compelling 
reasons to apply a bright-line rule in situations like this.  First, 
allowing an offset for unexplained deposits would 
“incentivize” debtors “not to come forward with any 
information that they had regarding the source of those funds,” 
Cohen, 487 B.R. at 625, even though the debtor is “certainly in 
a better position than the [t]rustee to determine the source of 
the unexplained deposits,” Titus IV, 2017 WL 5467712, at *6.  
Second, allowing an offset for unexplained deposits would 
allow debtors “to avoid judgment . . . merely by having funds 
deposited into the account that could not be traced.”  Cohen, 
487 B.R. at 625.  Third, even a “nonwage” unexplained deposit 
could be a fraudulent transfer.  “For example, if Paul Titus 
individually owned a rare painting, sold it for $268,167.09, and 
deposited the proceeds into the entireties checking account, 
those funds could not be used to offset objectionable 
expenses.”  Titus IV, 2017 WL 5467712, at *6; see also Titus 
III, 566 B.R. at 768 n.8. 
In sum, we affirm the decisions of the Bankruptcy Court 
and District Court not to allow unexplained nonwage deposits 
to offset the Tituses’ liability. 
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IV. Conclusion 
To recap, we reach three conclusions on the path to 
affirming the judgment of the District Court.  First, fraudulent-
transfer liability attaches to both Mr. and Mrs. Titus for the 
deposit of Mr. Titus’s wages from his law firm directly into the 
Tituses’ entireties bank account.  The wage deposits into the 
account constituted a “transfer” under the PUFTA.  Mrs. Titus 
is personally subject to fraudulent-transfer liability as a joint 
owner of the account.  And Mr. Titus is subject to transferee 
liability even though he is the debtor-transferor as well.  As a 
result, the wage deposits were a fraudulent transfer that the 
bankruptcy trustee could avoid. 
 
Second, the trustee waived any objection to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s chosen method to calculate the Tituses’ 
liability.  The Court followed the so-called Non-Necessities 
Approach, which holds that fraudulent-transfer liability is non-
necessity spending less nonwage deposits, and the trustee did 
not challenge the approach in his first appeal to the District 
Court.  Going forward for commingled accounts, however, the 
Non-Necessities Approach rests on an unreasonable 
expectation that a trustee can show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a dollar of wages was impermissibly spent on a 
non-necessity.  When deposits from different sources are 
commingled in an account, the Non-Necessities Approach 
almost always forces a trustee to explain the unexplainable.  
Absent other evidence, future courts instead should presume 
that any spending out of an entireties account is made up of a 
mixture of wage and nonwage dollars in proportion to the 
overall ratio of wage to nonwage deposits in the account.  This 
pro rata approach accounts practically for the commingling of 
fungible funds and is not foreclosed by precedent in our 
Circuit. 
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Third, the Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err in its 
application of the Non-Necessities Approach.  The District 
Court had set out a simple rule that the Tituses had to explain 
the source of their deposits into the account.  Despite the 
parties’ stipulation that certain unexplained deposits were not 
wages, the Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err in refusing to 
offset the Tituses’ liability by the amount of those unknown 
deposits.   
 
Thus we affirm. 
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